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State or Market?  
Strategic Choices in Brazil’s  
Energy Sector1
Brazil is endowed with a unique combination of natural resources, land, climate and people, together with a dynamic economy and democratic institutions. No less 
than 26 percent of its energy is derived from renewable sources; 
83 percent of its electricity is generated by hydropower. It has 22 
percent of the planet’s potable water, and the largest potential 
for biomass. By 2013, it will be the fifth largest economy. In 
short, it has everything to be a success in anything it undertakes. 
And yet one of the country’s Achilles’ heels is the energy 
sector, not for lack of natural resources, but rather due to their 
mismanagement, burdensome regulatory structure and taxation, 
and dysfunctional rather than integrated energy planning. 
Politics permeates the process. In Lula’s government it is in turn 
infused with a statist-interventionist ideology that is dissuasive of 
foreign investment in energy infrastructure. Brazil is both a giant 
producer and consumer of energy, and is expanding on both 
counts at an exponential rate. 
Blessed with the recent discovery of as yet unquantified, but 
probably gigantic hydrocarbons resources at the pre-salt level – 
preliminary estimates suggest up to 50 billion barrels BOE – Brazil faces the opportunity of 
becoming a major oil and gas exporter, assuming that the required financing can be found, and 
with it the technology mobilised to extract crude oil economically from a depth of 7,000 metres 
below the ocean’s surface, at a distance of over 300 km from the coast. Both the financial and 
the technical challenges involved are immense, as is the task of training the manpower required, 
ensuring the domestic manufacture of machinery and equipment to meet demanding local 
content commitments, and building the 214 vessels, most of which have yet to be tendered, are 
needed as auxiliary and transport craft. These are daunting demands. 
1 The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of any institution with which he is affiliated
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There are a few perverse risks involved as well. One is the danger of contracting the ‘Dutch 
disease’, even if the government has created a fund that will absorb, and disburse for 
social development purposes, excess liquidity from pre-salt revenues. Another is that, in a 
continent where energy diplomacy plays a pre-eminent role in international relations, Brazil 
may have to continue buying 30M m3/d natural gas from Bolivia, for political reasons, 
beyond the expiration date in 2019 of the current GSA, although Brazil itself would by then 
have a surfeit of gas. Yet another risk is that Brazil’s economic growth continues to proceed at 
such a rate that, by the time pre-salt reserves are commercially exploited, as of 2016, domestic 
demand is such that there will be virtually no surplus left for export. At least, however, the 
country will then be self-sufficient in oil, as indeed it is now.
Petrobras announced on 15 January 2010 the volume of its proven domestic reserves of oil and 
gas: 14,865 billion barrels (by SPE measuring criteria), in 2009, a 1.5 percent reduction from 
the previous year (220 million BOE) resulting from the non-inclusion of Petrobras’ reserves in 
Bolivia. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA) Brazil’s oil production in 2010 will be 
the highest outside OPEC, increasing by 160,000 barrels per day, to 2.7 million barrels per day. 
The Agency reports that pre-salt output will rise significantly as the Tupi field will enter this year 
the first phase of commercial production, with 100,000 barrels per day through to December. 
The IEA sees the Brazilian Congress as lagging behind on the approval process for the pre-salt 
regulatory framework, and this institutional paradigm is essential to determine the speed at 
which reserves may be developed. 
THE ENERGY MATRIx
The Brazilian energy matrix is dominated by hydropower (71 percent of the 105,900 MW of 
installed capacity), of which there is still an enormous untapped potential. The government has 
in recent years begun developing some very large hydropower complexes, mostly in Amazonia 
(two on the Madeira river (6,450 MW), and one at Belo Monte (11,220 MW) on the xingu) 
but the effort has been plagued by the difficulty in procuring environmental licences from the 
federal Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), as well 
as its counterparts in the states. IBAMA takes a ‘holier-than-thou’ approach that often results, 
paradoxically, in the need to build and operate oil-fired interruptible-cycle thermo-electric 
plants, which are of course much more polluting than the hydro-electric ones. IBAMA is unable 
to cope with the rhythm of expansion of Brazil’s power sector, and has now under review, for 
purposes of granting environmental licences, no less than 24 hydro-electric projects large and 
small, which in the aggregate amount to 33,440 MW, i.e. over twice the capacity of Itaipu 
(14,000 MW). This is a serious problem that the government has not been able to solve. 
The global financial crisis, resulting in a strong economic deceleration in Brazil in late 
2008 and early 2009, had one positive effect: it reconciled supply of and demand 
for electric power. According to the National Operator of the Electric System (ONS), 
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the average demand in 2008 and 2009 has 
remained virtually stationary, at 51,897 
MW, while supply has grown by 3,174 MW. 
While there are huge hydropower projects 
planned or under construction, until 2013 
generation will grow increasingly in the 
form of thermo-electric power plants. By 
that year, the average offer of electric power 
will be 68,712 MW, with demand averaging 
64,664 MW, i.e. leaving a positive margin 
of 4,048 MW. However, there is lingering 
uncertainty about 19 new thermo-electric 
plants due to come on stream between 2010 
and 2011. Most of those in the Northeast 
are oil-fired, with diesel-powered plants 
produce about 3,900 MW. Over 60 percent 
of Brazil’s hydro-electric potential is located 
in the Amazon region, which raises 
environmental licensing problems and 
resistance from local indigenous populations. 
Thermo-electric plants account for 23.6 
percent of Brazil’s current electricity generation, 
with hydro-electric plants accounting for 
71 percent. 93 other plants, amounting to 
11,500 MW generating capacity, are under 
construction, and about 58.8 percent of the 
electric power to be generated by these plants 
(3,900 MW) will come from fossil-fuel fired 
thermo-electric plants. 
It is clear that the national power grid is 
vulnerable to man-made or natural accidents 
and that this is principally due to lack of 
investment in the system. Indeed, federal 
investments in infrastructure are pitiful: By 
August 2009 Eletrobras had invested only 
38 percent of its budget for infrastructure. 
The Ministry of Mines and Energy this 
year lost R$6 billion (US$3.53 billion) of its 
resources earmarked for investment. The cost 
of transmission rose 500 percent over the 
last ten years. R$10.5 billion were invested 
(US$6.17 billion) to expand the grid by 26,000 
km, according to the Brazilian Electricity 
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL). 
Even before pre-salt reservoirs begin to be 
commercially exploited, Brazil will have a 
surfeit of natural gas. By September 2009, the 
country had accumulated a surplus averaging 
38M m3/d that will rise by another 10M m3/d 
in mid-2010, with the entry into operation of 
the Mexilhao field in the Santos basin. Once 
pre-salt fields come on stream, the surplus 
may rise to 80M m3/d. Antonio Menezes, 
head of the gas and electric power division 
of Shell Brazil, ascribes the glut of natural gas 
to the current model of the electric power 
sector, which discourages investments in gas 
and energy. Thermo-electric plants are only 
activated on an emergency basis, in periods 
of drought, and almost all electric power 
is still derived from hydropower. Menezes 
observes that after 2020, when pre-salt will 
be exploited at full tilt, Brazil’s gas reserves 
will amount to at least 1.8 trillion m3, part of 
which could be exported. 
Current demand for gas in Brazil averages 40M 
m3/d, more than half of which is imported 
from Bolivia under an agreement signed in 
1999 which will remain in force over the next 
ten years. The question that then arises is what 
will Brazil’s posture be in regard to Bolivia, 
even admitting that, for political rather than 
economic reasons, natural gas will continue 
to be imported from the country beyond the 
expiration of the contract in 2019. Nobody 
seems to know in either country. At the end 
of 2009, Brazil gave two “Christmas gifts” 
to Bolivia. One, a contractual consequence 
of the 1999 agreement provides for quarterly 
price readjustments, which means that since 
January 2010 Brazil pays about seven percent 
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more for Bolivia’s gas. Two, under the Act of Brasilia since between presidents Lula and Evo 
Morales in 2007 and additional provisions agreed on 18 December 2009 between Petrobras 
and Bolivian state firm YPFB, the former will compensate the latter for the use of “rich liquid 
components” (of high caloric value) contained in Bolivia’s natural gas retroactively to 2007 and 
up to 2019. This will yield Bolivia extra revenue of about US$100 million per annum, or US$1.2 
billion aggregate. Petrobras resisted as much as it could, but in the end abided by Lula’s political 
decision to aid Bolivia.
Nuclear energy is expanding: in addition to the existing two thermo-nuclear plants (at Angra 
dos Reis, near Rio de Janeiro), the government has started to build a third one at the same 
location, and plans to build six other ones, with an aggregate capacity of 6,000 MW, by 2020. 
It is noteworthy that Brazil has the world’s sixth largest uranium reserves and has developed its 
own uranium-enrichment technology for peaceful purposes, under IAEA supervision. 
As to alternative sources of energy, one of the most dynamic components of the matrix is that 
of biomass, of which Brazil has the largest reserves on the planet. In 1975, as a corollary to the 
first OPEC oil crisis, the Pro-Alcohol programme for the production of ethanol was created, and 
Brazil has been at the forefront of biofuels technology and use as an automotive fuel. Prospects 
for continued expansion of the sector, domestically and for export, are impressive. However, 
ethanol is losing its competitive edge over petrol, in terms of price, mostly in Brazil. Given the 
recent rise in sugar prices worldwide, an increasing proportion of sugar-cane production is 
devoted to sales of the commodity than to ethanol processing. Accordingly, the government 
has decided to reduce the proportion of ethanol added to petrol, as of 1 February 2010, from 
25 to 20 percent. Meanwhile, other alternative sources such as solar energy and wind-power 
are peripheral to the energy matrix.
THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
Brazil has a complex institutional framework for managing its energy sector, but it works most 
of the time in an un-coordinated fashion. It is also ponderous and unwieldy. At the political 
level, the President of the Republic takes the most important policy decisions, assisted by the 
Chief of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency and by the Minister of Mines and Energy. There 
is an advisory body to the President, the National Council on Energy Policy (CNPE), whose 
duties include definition of the areas to be auctioned for exploration and production (E&P). 
There are also two normative-regulatory agencies, respectively for the electric power sector 
(ANEEL) and for petroleum, gas, biomass and alternative sources of energy (ANP). Finally, there 
is a federal Enterprise for Energy Research (EPE), which undertakes planning for the electric 
power sector, in which there is also a federal holding company, Eletrobras, which has regional 
and sectorial affiliates, and there is a National Operator of the System (NOS, an agency that 
manages the power grid). 
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In the petroleum and gas sector, there is 
of course Petrobras, with an array of subsidiaries 
both domestic and foreign. These include 
BR Distribuidora (fuels distribution), Transpetro 
(transport), and Petrobras Bioenergia (bio-
fuels). The Board of Petrobras is heavily 
political, and is currently chaired by the 
Chief of the Civil Cabinet of the Presidency 
– Ms. Dilma Rousseff, Lula’s candidate to 
succeed him as President in the elections of 
3 October 2010. 
As regards pre-salt, the Lula government 
decided in 2009 to propose to Congress – 
where the legislation is pending – an entirely 
new structure, as follows: (a) a production-
sharing system (rather than the concessions 
system in force for conventional E&P); (b) a 
new public enterprise, 100 percent state-
owned, provisionally called Petro-Sal, whose 
function it will be to manage all pre-salt 
resources; (c) a Social Fund, to administer the 
revenues derived from pre-salt, other than 
those earmarked for federal, state and local 
royalties; (d) capitalisation of Petrobras, which 
will be sole operator of pre-salt projects and will 
have at least 30 percent participation in those 
allocated to other enterprises. The Chamber of 
Deputies approved on 9 December the basic 
text of the bill establishing the production-
sharing system, which was hotly debated for 
two weeks, and now proceeds to the Senate. 
In the Chamber of Deputies, the government 
had to yield on several counts to states and 
municipalities on the tricky issue of allocation 
of royalties. 
There are several major bottlenecks for the 
development of Brazil’s pre-salt resources, 
even assuming that all the other conditions 
are met: that the regulatory framework is in 
place, the colossal financing and complex 
technology can be found, the huge fleet of 
the auxiliary vessels is built on schedule, and 
a crash programme implemented to train the 
required manpower at different levels. The 
other principal remaining obstacle relates 
to procurement, given the government’s 
policy – soon to be embodied into law – for 
the promotion of local content, if need be 
at the expense of price, beyond the current 
minimum of 65 percent. The problem will 
be to develop a Brazilian suppliers’ chain 
for those E&P systems and equipments, for 
example special offshore drilling platforms and 
other sophisticated machinery and electronics, 
rendered scarce by heated world demand, and 
which will have to be produced domestically, 
for the first time, to serve Petrobras’ needs. 
Just before Christmas 2009, the company’s 
president, Jose Sergio Gabrielli, described 
the problem, and the company’s reliance 
on the government’s Programme for 
Mobilisation of the National Petroleum and 
Natural Gas Industry (PROMINP) to identify 
the many bottlenecks and overcome them. 
For instance, there is currently no production 
in Brazil of certain corrosion-resistant steels, 
nor certain gas-powered turbines, rivet 
compressors, certain types of valves, cranes, 
etc. Entirely new metallurgical, chemical 
and other systems will have to be devised. 
Gabrielli said that Petrobras is establishing 
the necessary infrastructure, and co-operating 
with a number of foreign firms on setting 
up in Rio de Janeiro research and tool-
manufacturing facilities. The company also 
has available funds to finance technological 
innovation for domestic suppliers, but the 
challenges remain daunting. 
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SPECIFIC ISSUES
The dysfunctional state of Brazil’s current 
energy system is attested to by the question 
of refining. In 1995 Petrobras lost the 
monopolistic position it had enjoyed in regard 
to the oil and gas sector since the creation of 
the company in 1953 by president Vargas. 
Petrobras thrived after the Petroleum Law 
of 1997, proposed by president Cardoso, 
which created ANP and the system of annual 
tenders (Rounds) of concessions for E&P, in 
which foreign oil companies became active 
participants – mostly in partnership with 
Petrobras. There are nevertheless certain 
segments in which Petrobras to this day 
enjoys a virtual monopoly, by its ownership 
of most pipelines and gas pipelines, as well 
as refineries. Paradoxically, until very recently, 
when a conversion programme was put into 
effect, most of Brazil’s refineries were incapable 
of processing Brazilian crude oil, which tends 
to be low-grade, heavy and acid. They were 
designed to process imported, of which for 45 
years Petrobras produced very little anyway. 
Conversion of these refineries, while necessary, 
is very costly. For political reasons, Petrobras is 
partnering with Venezuela’s PDVSA to build a 
refinery at Suape, state of Pernambuco, which 
will process both imported Venezuelan and 
Brazilian ultra-heavy crude, at a cost of US$23 
billion, including vast overruns. 
This episode raises the basic issue of 
whether Petrobras, the world’s fifth largest 
international oil company in terms of market 
value, operating in 25 countries, and with 
over 36 percent foreign shareholders, is 
primarily a branch of the Brazilian state or 
an integrated, competitive international 
energy company. Under the Lula government, 
political interference in Petrobras’ strategic 
corporate policy decisions has become routine, 
for example when the company started E&P 
operations in Cuba and Iran, or when it had 
to yield to Evo Morales’ expropriation of two 
Petrobras refineries in Bolivia. The chairperson 
of the Board of Petrobras is the Chief of the 
Civil Cabinet of the Presidency, and two cabinet 
ministers sit on the Board. Small wonder, then, 
that there should be such interference. The 
company’s staff has a core staff of excellent 
technical level, but departmental directors are 
selected primarily on a political basis. 
REGIONAL ENERGY INTEGRATION
Where Europe has the Energy Charter Treaty 
to foster economic integration, South America 
does not have anything similar, except for 
pious exhortations from regional integration 
institutions, and mechanisms, of which 
there are many. And yet the region has the 
potential for such energy integration, given 
the complementary nature of South America’s 
national energy mixes. Argentina used to 
export natural gas to Chile and to Uruguay but, 
having adopted policies dissuasive to foreign 
investment in the energy sector, now imports 
gas from Bolivia, and even intermittently, from 
Brazil (as well as electric power). Bolivia lives 
off natural gas, selling it to Argentina and 
Brazil, although the latter no longer needs it. 
Brazil on occasion buys oil from Venezuela, 
exports electricity to Argentina and Uruguay, 
and generally engages in intermittent trading 
in energy with its neighbours. There is not, 
however, a strategy for energy integration. 
Brazil intends to build six hydropower plants 
in Peru, yielding 6,000 MW, which, when this 
capacity comes on stream, should be exported 
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CONCLUSIONS
What are the prospects for the future? It all 
depends on who should be elected president 
of Brazil next October, and taking office 
on 1 January 2011. If it should be Dilma 
Rousseff, Lula’s anointed heiress-apparent, we 
could expect more of same – i.e. a populist 
administration, favouring state interventionism 
in practically every sector of the economy, and 
most assuredly in the strategic energy sector. 
Should the elected president be Jose Serra, 
currently governor of the state of Sao Paulo, 
one could expect a performance-orientated 
administration, austerely managed, with less 
international protagonism than Lula’s, and – 
probably – less sympathy for Brazil’s populist 
spendthrift neighbours. Since the electoral 
campaign does not officially start until April 
2010, there is always the possibility that 
another candidate may surface. But, at this 
stage, that is unlikely. ■
to western Brazil, but the length of the 
transmission lines (1,600 km) would probably 
make this a very onerous proposition. Brazil 
itself has a problem with Paraguay, which co-
owns on an equal basis the Itaipu hydropower 
plant but sells to Brazil 95 percent of its 50 
percent share of the 14,000 MW the plant 
generates. Again, for diplomatic reasons, the 
Brazilian government, under Lula, has yielded 
to several Paraguayan demands, including a 
sizeable (7 percent) rise in the price of the 
electricity it purchases, which is being passed 
on to consumers. 
Petrobras is active throughout South America, 
and also has operations in the Caribbean, the 
gulf of Mexico, West Africa and Central Asia, 
and Eletrobras was recently given the legal 
authority to extend its operations abroad 
(hence the Peruvian projects). The National 
Bank for Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES) finances Brazilian public 
and private enterprises engaged in overseas 
operations, several of them in the energy 
sector. In addition, there are substantial 
development aid projects sponsored by the 
Brazilian Co-operation Agency (ABC), part of 
the Foreign Ministry. 
New important actors have recently appeared 
on the scene – China and India – both with 
insatiable appetites for energy resources. An 
Indian company is involved in Brazilian E&P; 
China has lent Petrobras US$10 billion, and is 
building a gas pipeline in eastern Brazil. There 
are also technological exchanges between 
Petrobras and its Chinese counterparts. As 
pre-salt develops, one can expect China, 
which is also active in other South American 
countries, will take a more proactive stance 
regarding E&P in Brazil. 
